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court accepted, not the view that the evidence pointed to conspiracy in
some wider sense, but rather the view that where each member of a group
bases his behavior on such identity of interest the coordination thus
achieved is to be interpreted as conspiracy. Thus he regards the tobacco
decision as an acceptance by the Court of the practical implications of
the basic assumption of modem economic theory about oligopoly, namely,
"that a few dominant firms will, perhaps independently and purely as a
matter of self-interest, evolve non-aggressive [i.e., non-competitive] patterns of behavior." Coupling this interpretation with the Court's decision
that the test of monopolization is the existence of the power to exclude
competition rather than the abuse of that power, he finds that the case
has gone far "toward dosing the wide gap between the legal and economic
concepts of monopoly, which became so apparent to economists during the
1930's."
Mr. Nicholls poses clearly and cogently the question whether a fine in
a criminal proceeding or any antitrust decree short of dissolution is
capable of altering the pattern significantly; and he argues persuasively
that the Government's legal victory has not changed the major characteristics of price control over cigarettes. He thinks, however, that the
competitiveness of the cigarette industry might be substantially increased
by a tax upon advertising, graduated to reduce the advertising advantage
of the larger manufacturers, and by a shift of the excise tax to an ad
valorem basis until it can be entirely eliminated, in order to reduce the
tax burden upon the cheaper cigarettes.
CoRwIN D. EDvuas*

CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS, ILLINOIS AND FEDERAL, ANNOTATED. By Alex .Ison and Willard J. Lassers. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1952. 2 vols. Pp. xlii, 968. $30.00.
Eighty years ago Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., reviewed a Massachusetts form book in language which describes these volumes well:
"This is one of the first books which a lawyer practising in [Illinois] needs to buy. Indeed, it needs no recommendation to the
profession in this state, for its merits are already known. Unpretending as it is, it could not have been produced without a great deal
of patient industry, a familiarity with the reports and statutes, and
a union of ability and experience, which have enabled the author[s]
in the first place to discern and then to answer the questions which
arise in practice. It is one of those excellent books to which you can
go in a hurry and find what you want.... -"
Whatever is missing by way of specific comment from the Holmes'
quotation has been supplied by Mr. Chief justice Schaefer's approving
foreword to these volumes (pp. v-vi). Additional comment is unnecessary;
but the prolixity of a law professor is not to be denied.
These volumes fit the Holmes review to the smallest detail: "Its merits
are already known," for Mr. Elson's earlier work, Illinois Forms and
* Director of Bureau of Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
The views herein expressed are those of the reviewer, and not necessarily those
of the Commission.

1. Book Review, 6 Am. L. Rzv. 732 (1872), reprinted in
118 (Shriver ed. 1936).
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Precedents,2 has been in use for almost two decades. The "unpretending"
nature of the volumes is reflected in their title. To label these volumes
a "form book" was probably a necessity, since they certainly perform
the functions of making available to the user an excellent set of practice
forms. 3 In addition, however, they contain textual material which not
only assists the practitioner in making intelligent use of the available
forms, but provides a critical commentary on the present state of the
procedural rules in the state and federal courts. Moreover, since it deals
with both systems, it affords a basis for the comparative study of the
two which should prove helpful to those who would improve them.
One of the primary messages to be derived from the books is that no
lawyer can assume because he is versed in one system of procedure,
either state or federal, that he is the master of the other. The similar-4
ities are necessarily great since they are derived from a common source.
Unfortunately, their disparities are at least as numerous.
Both the Federal Rules and the Civil Practice Act are comparatively
recent procedural codifications. 5 Yet both have been in use long enough
to have been well tested by time. Each was a thoroughgoing overhauling
of the previously effective system. Each is the product of first-rate minds.
Each had the same objective: to provide "the means" to the end of "full,
equal and exact enforcement of substantive law.' 6 There are divergent
opinions as to which has better met that objective.
As already noted, a comparison of the two systems cannot help but
point up deficiencies and areas for improvement in both. 7 For example,
as the authors note, Illinois practice in the field of discovery would do
well to emulate the Federal Rules:
"In most respects, the Illinois Civil Practice Act compares favorably with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the field of discovery, however, the Civil Practice Act makes a poor showing. This
state of affairs is due to several facts. The Act itself, merely authorizes discovery by motion, where a bill of discovery would have been
available and permits other discovery techniques to be prescribed
by court rules.
"With respect to depositions, Rule 19 of the Supreme Court permits the taking of depositions in the manner provided by law for
taking depositions in chancery cases. Unfortunately, the deposition
2. (1934).
3. The authors make quite clear the limitations of a form book: "A form book
is not a substitute for the careful analysis of the facts and the law which must be
made in connection with the preparation of a court document. It is indeed an
unusual case that will fit exactly into the precise language of the printed form.
Forms such as we have included in this book can be helpful as a point of departure and as an outline and foundation for the fact and law situations facing a
particular lawyer in a particular case." P. viii.
4. A landmark volume on procedure in the trial court and its historical derivations has just been published. It deserves the careful attention of every member of
the bar who considers his calling a profession and not merely a business. It is
Professor Millar's THE PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERspECTIVE
(1952). See Clark, Book Review, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 739 (1952).
5. The Civil Practice Act became effective in 1934; the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in 1938.
6. Pound, The Etiquette of Justice, 3 REP. NEB. STATE BAR AssN. 231 (1908).
7. It is Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt's view that "the basic pattern of the
Federal civil rules is bound ultimately to prevail throughout the country."
VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 10 (1952).
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provisions in the Evidence and Deposition Act, are cumbersome and
outmoded. Other weaknesses in Illinois discovery procedure will be
noted in connection with individual topics." (p. 566)
At the same time, Rule 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois
could well be adapted to the Federal Rules and improve the discovery
procedure thereunder.
Again, Illinois procedure might benefit from the experience of the
federal system and amend its governing rules as the Federal Rules were
amended in 1947, to distinguish between the powers of a judge in dealing
with a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury
case and a motion for a directed verdict on the same ground in a jury
case:
"In an action tried by the court without a jury the court as trier
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against
the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close
of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits
against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in
Rule 52 (a)." 8
The purpose of the amendment was to permit a court to pass immediately upon conflicts of evidence and credibility of witnesses on a motion to
dismiss rather than to postpone such decisions until the end of the trial
as it would do where it must leave such issues to resolution by a jury.
The obvious value of shortening the time of trials in this manner must
certainly commend itself to a judicial system which finds its dockets in
such horrible condition as the Illinois courts now do.
Such a comparative approach to reform will not, however, supply all
the answers. One of the primary sources of difficulties in both systems
is to be found in statutory provisions outside of the Rules or the C.P.A.
which either conflict or confuse the application of the appropriate procedural rule. Here again, these volumes provide a guide to improvement.
To cite two examples: the defects of the Illinois discovery procedure
are due in part to the deficiencies in the Evidence and Deposition Act;
problems in federal interpleader result from inconsistencies between
Rule 22 and 28 U.S.C. §1335.
These are but samples of the valuable materials to be found in these
books outside of their primary function of providing the practitioner
with useful practice forms. Incidentally, another value is to the law
professor who can use these volumes to bring to his students raw
materials of procedure not usually available through ordinary course
materials.
In conclusion, it is to be noted that these volumes point up the basic
problem of the administration of justice. Assuming the perfect set of
procedural rules, only a judiciary which is competent, honest, and faithful to the underlying purposes of those rules can effect the desired
results. Assuming perfect judicial administrators, they cannot effect
justice when bound by procedural rules harking back to the theories
and methods of Baron Parke. As of this time we have neither the perfect
set of rules, nor the perfect set of judicial administrators. 9 Efforts are
under way to secure both. 10 "Fit legislation and fair adjudication are
8. Rule 41(b).

9. Only rhetoric recommends such gross understatement.
10. Adoption of the proposed Judicial Article for the Constitution of the State
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attainable. The ultimate reliance of society for the proper fulfillment
of both these august functions is to entrust them only to those who are
equal to their demands."" 1
PaiuiP B. KURLAND*
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE. By Roy Moreland. Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc. 1952. Pp. viii, 338. $7.50.
Some years ago Professor Moreland became particularly interested in
cases in which a defendant has been convicted of criminal homicide or of
battery as a result of death or harm caused unintentionally--other than
cases based upon the perpetration of felony or other "unlawful act" or
resistance to arrest. The result of an intensive study of this area was a
contribution entitled A Rationale of Criminal Negligence, which2 appeared
first in a series of law review articles1 and later in book form. It forms
the nucleus 3 of the present volume and is sufficiently well known to warrant the limitation of attention here to new materials plus such changes
as are found in the original part of the field.
This book is divided into five parts: I, The Law of Homicide Prior to
the Eighteenth Century; II, Homicide at Common Law; III, Statutory
Regulation of Homicide; IV, Defenses to Homicide; and V, Recommended Legislation.
In part I the author gives a concise picture of the origin of the law of
homicide and the development of the malice aforethought concept. In this
part of the volume he is entirely "orthodox," but from there on he does
not hesitate to leave the beaten path. Under the label of "intentional
murder" (Chs. 4, 12), for example, he includes all murder resulting from
an intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm. It has not been uncommon to speak of such murders as having been committed with "express
malice," but the phrase "intentional murder," heretofore used as a factual
designation rather than as a technical term, has customarily been reserved
for a homicide resulting from an actual intent to kill (without justification, excuse, or recognized mitigation). The author apparently finds his
usage necessary to fit in with his proposal to eliminate "malice" from the
homicide terminology. Thus, in a later part of the volume he says: "The
retention of 'malice' in the law of murder is a constant source of trouble
and confusion." This follows a statement to the effect that "it should
be excluded completely" (p. 205). Often more is lost than gained by the
abandonment of a term which has back of it centuries of judicial interof Illinois would go far toward improving the calibre of the judiciary. The
Joint Committee of the Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations is now actively
engaged in preparing amendments to the Civil Practice Act to effect some of the
necessary reforms.
11. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV.
527, 546 (1947).
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. 32 Ky. L.J. 1, 127, 221 (19434).
2. In 1944.
3. The earlier book had 138 pages exclusive of appendix, tables and index. And
the material found on more than 120 of those pages has been reproduced almost
word for word. The chief omissions are former Chapters 7 and 9. Chapter 7 could
not be included in its original form because the author has changed his views in
regard to what he terms "negligent murder"; and Chapter 9 dealt with battery which
is not within the scope of the present title.

